

over the participation of marginally related agencies can increase the "majority" impression which implicitly equates what "most" think with what is "probably right."

An interesting revelation of the effect of the intelligence estimative process came during the initial examination of escalation in the spring of 1964. In early March, the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State was authorized to study the possible consequences of various courses of U.S. military escalation against North Vietnam. For three weeks, the best political specialists from the Council, INR, and CIA labored on the question. The resulting stack of papers was uniformly pessimistic on any positive results coming from U.S. escalation, with varying degrees of alarm expressed over the negative consequences which might ensue. The study was then suppressed by the Council's chief, W.W. Rostow, and virtually identical questions were put to USIB for examination by the entire "intelligence community." During the next year a SNIE on one or another "scenarios" for possible U.S. military action in Southeast Asia emerged on almost a monthly basis. Most of the political analysts who had worked on the initial Policy Planning study took part in these estimates. Now, however, the basic interaction was not among political specialists but between political and military types. As "types," certain roles and behavior patterns emerged with subtle effect, resulting in an asymmetry of weight tipped in the direction of Pentagon preferences as opposed to those of State and CIA.